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Throughout history, philosophers, scientists, and other scholars have named and organized the salient elements of the world. These
eﬀorts have led to conceptualizations that diﬀer widely in both content and form. This paper argues that all conceptualizations are
biased, both because they depend on the purposes for which they have been created, and because they are closely tied to the world view
of their designers. This bias needs to be recognized, and its consequences need to be addressed if the conceptualizations are to be used for
purposes other than those for which they were designed. The paper begins with a brief overview of the disciplines that have been con-
cerned with conceptualizing particular domains. This is followed by a non-exhaustive, illustrative, historical perspective, and the paper
concludes with the interesting case study of biological taxonomy.
 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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For over two millennia there have been eﬀorts by philos-
ophers, scientists, and other scholars to name and organize
the salient elements of the world as they understood it.
These eﬀorts have led to conceptualizations that diﬀer not
only in their content and form, but also, and, importantly,
in the purpose for which they were developed. Gruber has
deﬁned a conceptualization as ‘‘. . .the objects, concepts,
and other entities that are assumed to exist in some area
of interest and the relationships that hold among them. . .
A conceptualization is an abstract, simpliﬁed view of the
world that we wish to represent for some purpose.’’ [1, p.
907]. This deﬁnition has been criticized on the grounds that
it is too vague, and that it has led to the circumstance that a
wide range of constructs have become ‘‘common bedfel-
lows’’ under a common rubric [2, p. vi]. Nonetheless, and
perhaps because Grubers deﬁnition allows a broad inter-
pretation, it is the deﬁnition of conceptualization that is
used here. The world that has been captured by these con-
ceptualizations can be as broad as the universe itself, or it1532-0464/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2005.08.007
E-mail address: alexa_mccray@hms.harvard.edu.can be as narrow as a highly restricted domain, such as
the world of restaurant dining [3].
It is the thesis of this paper that it is necessarily the case
that every conceptualization is biased. This is because rep-
resenting, or categorizing, the world depends on at least
two crucial factors (1) the purpose for which the conceptu-
alization is being created, and (2) the world view of its
designer, with the corollary that this depends on the state
of general knowledge at the time, as well as on the personal
knowledge of the designer. There is bias in the choice of the
categories themselves, in the hierarchical arrangement of
the categories, in the depth or level of granularity chosen,
and in the interrelationships that may or may not be made
explicit among the categories. Bias is understood here to be
a predisposed tendency toward a certain point of view,
which is most often based on a particular system of beliefs.
Bias does not immediately make a conceptualization incor-
rect or nonsensical, nor does it in any way need to diminish
the usefulness of the conceptualization. The bias simply
needs to be recognized, and its consequences need to be ad-
dressed if the conceptualization is to be used for some pur-
pose other than the one for which it was originally
designed.
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that have been concerned with conceptualizing, or catego-
rizing, particular domains, these disciplines being closely
allied with the purposes for which the conceptualizations
have been designed and the types of artifacts that result
from these eﬀorts. This is followed by a non-exhaustive,
illustrative, historical perspective. The paper concludes
with the interesting case study of biological taxonomy,
which illustrates many of the issues raised in this paper.
1.1. Conceptualizing the world
It is fair to say that all attempts at categorizing the
world have as their goal an accurate representation of some
reality, in some domain of interest. Philosophers, for exam-
ple, have and continue to be concerned with fundamental
notions of existence. Philosophical ontology, according to
one view, is ‘‘the science of what is, of the kinds and struc-
tures of objects, properties, events, processes and relations
in every area of reality.’’ [2, p. iii]. The goal may be to
understand the existence of a supreme being, to understand
the nature of existence, or, more broadly, to understand the
nature of reality. Philosophers since the time of Aristotle
have grappled with the relationship between language,
thought, and reality, and, in modern times, the views of
Frege [4], de Saussure [5], Ogden and Richards [6], and
Wittgenstein [7] have been particularly inﬂuential. Ogden
and Richards, for example, building on the work of both
Frege and de Saussure, propose the ‘‘semiotic triangle,’’
such that there is a referent (in reality), a symbol (language)
that may refer to that referent, and thought (the concept as
it exists in the brain). Characterizing how conceptual
knowledge is organized in the brain continues to be of
interest to both linguists and psychologists. Linguists such
as Dornseiﬀ [8] and Trier [9] propose that concepts are
grouped together in the brain according to certain shared
characteristics, and psychologists in their attempts to
understand the nature of cognition, have posited anatomi-
cal loci for semantic ﬁelds, or domains, in the brain [10]. A
New York Times article in the early 1990s reported, ‘‘For a
century or so, psychologists pondering the brains memory
handling system have suspected that the brain had some
system of putting information in categories, with a separate
pigeon-hole for categories like dogs, plants, or numbers,
each in a separate network of cells. . .in the past decade a
new surge of information has led to the identiﬁcation of
15–20 diﬀerent categories that appear to be the brains
own natural categories for knowledge.’’ [11]. Some neuro-
psychologists have posited a high-level distinction between
the semantic domains of natural kinds, such as animals and
plants, on the one hand and man-made objects, such as
tools and vehicles on the other [12]. Lesions, disease pro-
cesses and imaging techniques, such as PET scans and
functional MRIs are all used as evidence [13]. Recent ﬁnd-
ings, however, seem to support an attribute-based neural
organization of semantic knowledge, rather than basic cat-
egories [14].Closely allied with work in psychology, computer scien-
tists have, over the last forty years or so, attempted to mod-
el the world, or some particular portion of that world In
some cases, the purpose has been to mimic human cogni-
tive abilities, as in, for example, the CYC project which at-
tempts to capture human common sense reasoning [15].
Often, however, the goal has been to build practical com-
putational systems for applications such as machine trans-
lation, information extraction, question answering, and
text summarization [16]. The resultant artifacts have been
variously called frames, semantic networks, conceptual
graphs, and, most recently, ontologies [17–20]. For Gruber
an ontology is an ‘‘explicit speciﬁcation of a conceptualiza-
tion’’ [1, p. 907], and, similarly, for Poli it is a framework or
structure ‘‘within which catalogues, taxonomies, terminol-
ogies may be given suitable organization.’’ [20, p. 313].
Occasionally, particularly when researchers are working
within similar or the same domain there is strong disagree-
ment about what the correct representations should be.
Nowhere is this more true than in standardized coding sys-
tems. Medical coding systems, for example, have been
developed for epidemiological and data comparability pur-
poses, e.g., the International Classiﬁcation of Diseases of
the World Health Organization [21], for billing purposes,
e.g., the Current Procedural Terminology of the American
Medical Association [22], and yet others have been devel-
oped for information indexing and retrieval, most notably
the Medical Subject Headings of the National Library of
Medicine [23]. Chute alludes to some of the disagreements
over the years in the ﬁeld of medical coding systems:
‘‘Many authors have derided one modality or another, fail-
ing to recognize that each serves its purpose.’’ [24, p. 301].
Coding systems have in common that they regulate the ter-
minology that is allowed [25]. The NISO thesaurus stan-
dard states, for example, that controlled vocabularies for
information retrieval must be arranged in a speciﬁc order
such that ‘‘. . .relationships among terms are clearly dis-
played and identiﬁed. . . Its purposes are to promote consis-
tency in the indexing of documents, predominantly for
post-coordinated information storage and retrieval sys-
tems, and to facilitate searching by linking entry terms with
descriptors.’’ [26, p. 38]. The standard not only has naming
rules, but it also gives guidelines for the hierarchical
arrangement of the terms and for allowable inter-term rela-
tionships. In spite of the prescriptive nature of these coding
systems, there is rarely agreement on the resulting artifacts.
There is often dissatisfaction with the concepts chosen, the
granularity with which the concepts are represented, and
the hierarchical or relational structure into which the con-
cepts have been placed.
Work on biological taxonomies shares some of the same
problems. Biologists, in the pursuit of knowledge about liv-
ing beings, have developed taxonomies to represent biolog-
ical knowledge as they understand it. Arguments about
how to accomplish this have been in evidence since even be-
fore the time of Linnaeus. Ereshefsky notes that one area
of disagreement is whether a biologic entity should be rep-
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whether it can be represented in multiple, equally accept-
able positions (pluralism). He says, ‘‘But why should we
prefer a single classiﬁcation of a multifarious world?
Because. . .taxonomic monism avoids ambiguity, promotes
communication, and helps the advancement of science by
funneling resources to the most promising project. . .’’ [27,
p. 41], but later, ‘‘Perhaps the world itself, and not our
inability to make reliable contact with it, gives us reason
to adopt a pluralistic stance toward taxonomy.’’ [27, p. 45].
Topical dictionaries, such as Rogets Thesaurus, that
organize their entries within a conceptual framework face
similar taxonomic issues. According to Hu¨llen, these dic-
tionaries are subject to ‘‘religious, ideological, political, sci-
entiﬁc, or otherwise predetermined world views’’ of their
developers. ‘‘Quite often, the authors of these dictionaries
seem to be enchanted by the inherent systematicity of their
semantic organization and are lured into a perfection and
exhaustiveness which overshoots lexicographical purpos-
es.’’ [28, p. 14–15].
1.2. Illustrative historical perspective
All of the disciplines discussed in the previous section
have in common that they have created conceptualizations
of a particular domain of interest, whether this be for
philosophical, scientiﬁc, or practical reasons. In what fol-Table 1
Conceptualizing the world: examples from history (Major categories are separ
Century Person/background Categories
13th BC Amenopeˇ Scribe Sky, water, earth;
beings; Towns of E
and their products
4th BC Aristotle Scholar, Philosopher Substance; Quantit
2nd Julius Pollux Scholar Gods; People; Rela
organization; Uten
7th Isidore of Seville Clergyman Grammar (literatu
geometry, music, a
Alphabetical list of
ﬁelds; Stones and m
garments; Utensils
10th Aelfric Clergyman God, heaven, earth
human character; I
Wild animals; Her
15th William Caxton Merchant Formulae for greet
ranks, names of pr
16th John Withals Educator World; Elements: a
family; Life and de
16th Nicodemus Frischlin Poet,
Scholar, Educator
God; Nature: (1) u
rationality, (2) kno
17th Jan Comenius Clergyman,
Scholar, Educator
Naturalia, the wor
Moralia, the way m
everything concern
17th John Wilkins Clergyman,
Scholar, Educator
God and the unive
quantity, quality, a
19th Peter Mark Roget Doctor,
Scholar
Abstract relations
(inorganic, organic
intersocial); Aﬀecti
19th Melvil Dewey Librarian,Entrepreneur General; Philosoph
Arts; Literature; Hlows, some speciﬁc examples from throughout history are
presented. Table 1 lists examples of the categorizations that
have been developed, together with the individuals who
created them and their backgrounds.
The conceptualizations presented in this section clearly
have depended on the purpose for which they were created,
the training and occupation of the individuals who created
them, and the social and scientiﬁc milieu in which they
were created.
As early as 1200 BC the Egyptian scribe Amenope˘ had
as his stated goal to create a universal catalogue that would
classify all that was known at the time. His Onomasticon (a
compilation of names) was intended for ‘‘clearing the mind,
for instruction of the ignorant and for learning all things
that exist: . . . heaven with its aﬀairs, earth and what is in
it, what the mountains belch forth, what is watered by
the ﬂood. . .’’ [29, p. 71]. Gardiner, who has undertaken a
thorough study of the work states, ‘‘Certainly there was
never written a book more tedious and less inspired than
the Onomasticon of Amenope˘.’’ [29, p. 24], and ‘‘Out of
such grotesque beginnings have our encyclopedias arisen.’’
[29, p. 35]. The book clearly did not meet its stated goal, for
example, the last of Amenope˘s categories, ‘‘Parts of an ox
and kinds of meat,’’ make it seem as though at this point
the scribe simply ‘‘abruptly abandoned or was released
from his tedious task.’’ [29, p. 37]. Nonetheless, the urge
to create a universal catalogue of the world can be seenated by ;)
Persons, court, oﬃces, occupations; Classes, tribes, types of human
gypt; Buildings, their parts, types of land; Agricultural land, cereals
; Beverages; Parts of an ox and kinds of meat
y; Quality; Relation; Place, Time; Position; State; Action; Aﬀection
tionships; Science and Arts; Hunting; Meals; Trades; Law; Town
sils
re); Rhetoric and dialectic; Four mathematical sciences (arithmetic,
nd astronomy); Medicine; Law and chronology; Theology; Languages;
words; Man and monsters; Animals; Universe; Earth; Buildings and
etals; Agriculture; War and amusements; Ships, buildings,
, mankind; Parts of human body; Society; Negative features of
ntellectual work; Diseases, aﬄictions, merits; Weather; Birds; Fish;
bs; Trees; Buildings; War; Human vices
ings; Objects: house and furniture, food, commerce; Oﬃces, social
ofessions, trades, crafts; Pilgrimage; Counting, money
ir, water, earth; Man: crafts, housing, city; Society: law, church,
ath: human body, war, senses
niverse, space, time, elements, (2) kingdoms of nature; Man: (1)
wledge and labor, (3) society
ld as created by God; Artiﬁcialia, the world as created by man;
an treats the world with which he is entrusted; Spiritualia,
ed with religion
rse; Substance: the four elements, the kingdoms of nature; Accident:
ction, relation
(existence, quantity, time. . .); Space (dimensions, motion . . .); Matter
); Intellect (formation and communication of ideas); Volition (individual,
ons (moral, religious. . .)
y; Theology; Sociology; Philology; Natural Science; Useful Arts; Fine
istory
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Sevilles work, Etymologie, sive Origines, written in the ear-
ly Middle Ages, is a compilation that includes literature,
the sciences, medicine, law, history, theology, the universe
and the natural world, and the secular activities of man.
For Isidore, ‘‘the road to knowledge was by way of words’’
[30, p. 33]. He believed that if he could discover the origins
of all words then he would discover the truth about the
world. For example, in book 11, Isidore says, ‘‘Homo is
so named because he is made of humus (earth), as it is told
in Genesis. . .’’ [30, p. 213]. The work was commissioned by
the Bishop of Saragossa, who was interested in a compila-
tion of ‘‘all that ought to be known.’’ [30, p. 31]. Brehaut
notes, ‘‘Although Isidore is not surpassed in comprehen-
siveness by any one of the line of Roman encyclopedists
who preceded him, in the quality of his thought and the ex-
tent of his information, he is inferior to them all. Secular
knowledge had suﬀered so much from attrition and decay
that it could now be summarized in its entirety by one
man. . .’’ [30, p. 33]. While the work was disappointing in
its lack of insight and low level of scholarly ability, it had
a surprisingly strong inﬂuence on thought throughout the
Middle Ages.
Aristotles Categories, written many centuries earlier,
had the philosophical goal of establishing the relationship
between language, truth, knowledge, and reality. Modrak
says, ‘‘The Categories. . .is a work that claims both to pro-
vide a classiﬁcation scheme for predicates and to articulate
the ontological framework that holds true not only of lan-
guage, but of the world.’’ [31, p. 28]. Rhetoric, or the art of
persuasive speech, was of great importance to scholars dur-
ing Roman times, and, as such, an additional goal for Aris-
totle was for the Categories to be useful for improving
public speaking. This goal was shared by Julius Pollux, a
professor of rhetoric in Athens, who writing several hun-
dreds of years later than Aristotle, created his own Ono-
masticon. Polluxs categories included words related to
gods (e.g., altars, priests, pious and impious people), people
and their relationships (e.g., age groups, birth, marriage,
masters, and slaves), science and arts (e.g., grammar, rhet-
oric, dance, medicine, and diseases), law (e.g., court, judg-
es, and trials), and several categories devoted to the daily
activities of the time, such as hunting and trading (e.g.,
dogs, game, buying and selling, games, ladies toiletry)
[28, p. 44]. According to Hu¨llen, many who developed such
onomastica, with their lists of categories and words, were
actually interested in representing the world: ‘‘. . .the com-
pilation of such lists can have the aim of incorporating
all the knowledge of the world that exists at a given mo-
ment, and also the best way of speaking about it.’’ [28, p.
44].
In the 15th and 16th centuries, one important motiva-
tion for categorizing all that was known was for the pur-
pose of foreign language learning and teaching. An
interesting example of this was the Dialogues in French
and English written and printed by William Caxton in
1483. Caxton was a British merchant who traded in goodswith Belgium and the Netherlands. Some of the goods he
imported for the enjoyment of the English nobility were
illuminated manuscripts. These manuscripts were most of-
ten written in French and Caxton ﬁrst translated and then
printed the manuscripts for his aristocratic clients. ‘‘By
printing English translations of these works he could cor-
ner the market, for he alone would be able to provide mem-
bers of the English nobility with reasonably priced books
which contained what was currently the most fashionable
reading matter in their own language.’’ [32, p. viii], In the
course of this he created the Dialogues which were meant
to teach those who were interested in becoming more pro-
ﬁcient in French, which had supplanted Latin as the
learned language of the day. Note that among categories
such as formulae for greetings, oﬃces and social ranks,
and household objects, he includes an entire category for
counting and money. Withals and Frischlin in the 16th cen-
tury were also primarily interested in language teaching.
Withals work, A shorte dictionarie for yonge beginners,
was an English-Latin vocabulary meant for young boys,
and the categories were chosen such that they could be
more easily memorized; ‘‘I haue drawen as diligently as I
coulde, the propre names of thynges conteyned vnder one
kynde, and disposed them in such ordre, that every childe
beying able to reade, may with little labour perﬁtely im-
printe them in memory. . .’’ [28, p. 175]. Frischlin, a Ger-
man professor, poet, and teacher, wrote Nomenclator
Trilinguis in 1586. The work contained the by now stan-
dard major categories of God, nature, and man, and listed
all words in three languages, Greek, Latin, and German.
The most sophisticated approach in this tradition was
taken by Jan Comenius some ﬁfty years later. Comenius
was from the area that is now called the Czech Republic
and lived in many parts of Europe throughout his career
as an educator. He believed in universal literacy and devot-
ed his life to ‘‘the cause of education, both as teacher and
educational theorist. . .’’ [33, p. 5]. His Janua linguarum res-
erata, published in 1631 and revised in 1657, was meant to
teach Latin to school children and as such was a departure
from earlier texts that were primarily literary in nature and
had little to do with the daily life of the students. [33, p. 16].
According to Hu¨llen: ‘‘Comenius is the probably unique
ﬁgure for whom a dictionary. . .was the direct expression
of a philosophical and pedagogical idea. . .the making of
dictionaries was directly linked to the elaboration of his
system of thought. This system is composed of theological,
philosophical, linguistic, and pedagogic elements.’’ [28, p.
371]. Comenius conviction that reality, thought, and
speech were highly interdependent meant that, for him,
learning a language involved ‘‘. . .causing ones mind to
operate according to the structure of reality.’’ [28, p.
372]. Comenius four categories, Naturalia, Artiﬁcialia,
Moralia, and Spiritualia, reﬂect well his view of the world,
which was strongly determined by his religious beliefs.
By the 16th century the predominance of Latin as the
language of scholarly communication had begun to wane,
and by the 17th there were eﬀorts to develop a universal,
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36]. Comenius view was that such a universal language
should be based on a description of reality and that this
would then also lead to a better understanding of the nat-
ure of language itself [36, p. 176]. Bishop John Wilkins in
1668 published his detailed Essay Towards a Real Charac-
ter, and a Philosophical Language, in which he developed a
complicated artiﬁcial language where ideas were represent-
ed by complex signs that denoted the constituent elements
of their referents [37]. For example, ‘‘. . .in his word for
dog there were symbols to identify the species in general,
indicating elements such as beast and viviparous (pro-
ducing living young) and the species in particular indicat-
ing elements such as rapacious (living on prey). . .’’ [36,
p. 175]. Sparck Jones points out that although Wilkins
work was a ‘‘noble undertaking,’’ it was never used: ‘‘. . .the
conceptual classiﬁcations deﬁning its content were both far
too complicated and too dependent on the particular de-
tails of particular scientiﬁc, philosophical and religious be-
liefs.’’ [38, p. 217].
Peter Mark Roget, a physician by training, was also
interested, more than 200 years later, in the notion of a uni-
versal language. After a long and successful career as a
doctor, he began work on his Thesaurus of English Words
and Phrases in 1848 at the age of 68, completing it six years
later. Speaking of his classiﬁcatory structure, he says,
‘‘Metaphysicians engaged in the more profound investiga-
tion of the Philosophy of Language will be materially
assisted by having the ground thus prepared for
them. . .such analyses alone can determine the principles
on which a strictly Philosophical Language might be con-
structed. The probable result of the construction of such
a language would be its eventual adoption by every civi-
lized nation; thus realizing that splendid aspiration of phi-
lanthropists, the establishment of a Universal Language.’’
[39, p. xxiii]. His primary aim, however, was much more
practical. He was interested in providing a reference work
for writers, and particularly for those who were engaged
in language translation. He says, ‘‘We seek in vain the
words we need, and strive ineﬀectually to devise forms of
expression which shall faithfully portray our thoughts
and sentiments. The appropriate terms, notwithstanding
our utmost eﬀorts, cannot be conjured up at will. Like
‘‘spirits from the vasty deep,’’ they come not when we call-
It is to those who are thus painfully groping their way and
struggling with the diﬃculties of composition, that this
Work professes to hold out a helping hand.’’ [39, p. vi–
vii]. But, perhaps, what motivated Roget most strongly
was what he saw to be the decline of the English language.
In another characteristically hyperbolic statement, he says,
‘‘Some modern writers, however, have indulged in a habit
of arbitrarily fabricating new words and a new-fangled
phraseology, without any necessity, and with manifest inju-
ry to the purity of language. This vicious practice, the oﬀ-
spring of indolence or conceit, implies an ignorance or
neglect of the riches in which the English language already
abounds, and which would have supplied them with wordsof recognized legitimacy, conveying precisely the same
meaning as those they so recklessly coin in the illegal mint
of their own fancy.’’ [39, p. xxi–xxii].
Standardizing and regulating library cataloging practic-
es was the goal of Melvil Dewey in establishing his Decimal
Classiﬁcation, which was ﬁrst published in 1876 [40–42].
According to Miksa, Dewey, as well as many others who
created classiﬁcatory schemes to organize knowledge, be-
lieved that hierarchical structures of knowledge categories
were somehow natural, ‘‘. . .that is, they reﬂect the way
the human mind produces and uses knowledge and the
way such knowledge exists in its various relationships.’’
[42, p. 41]. Dewey, in addition to being a trained librarian
— he was a co-founder of the American Library Associa-
tion—was also an entrepreneur. He worked hard to estab-
lish his Decimal Classiﬁcation as the only cataloging system
used in U.S. libraries, speciﬁcally asking that libraries use it
without alteration. When the Library of Congress ap-
proached Dewey in 1899 about adopting his system, Dewey
refused because the Library intended to make changes to it
to serve its own purposes [42, p. 43–44].
1.3. Challenges in representing reality—a case study
The Linnaean system of naming and classifying plants
and animals has been used by zoologists and botanists
for over 250 years. The taxonomy depends crucially on a
system of hierarchical, categorical ranks, or levels. Once
a taxon is created, each of its members is required to have
the essential properties of that taxon. Linnaeus original
system has ﬁve levels, so Homo sapiens, for example, be-
longs to the Kingdom Animalia, the Class Mammalia, the
Order Primate, the Genus Homo, and the Species Homo
sapiens. (These ﬁve levels have been expanded over the last
hundred years so that now there are 21 levels, in the so-
called Modern Synthesis [43].) Notice that species names
are actually binomials, consisting of the genus and species
name together. Linnaeus felt that biologists should memo-
rize all species names, but since he recognized that there
were too many of these to make memorization feasible,
he reasoned that if the biologist memorized all genus names
instead—in his estimation there were some 300 plant gen-
era and just over 300 animal genera—then at least the tax-
onomic rank of the species would be immediately
recognizable. Since, for Linnaeus, the number of genera
was set once and for all in Gods original creation, the
number would not increase and memorization of genus
names would be a more reasonable expectation.
For Darwin, whose work appeared more than a century
afterLinnaeus, and forwhomspecies are the result of gradual
evolutionary changes, theappropriatemethod for classifying
organismswas as follows: ‘‘All true classiﬁcation is genealog-
ical; that community ofdescent is the hiddenbondwhichnat-
uralists have been unconsciously seeking, and not some
unknown plan of creation, or enunciation of general propo-
sitions; and the mere putting together and separating of ob-
jects more or less alike.’’ [Darwin 1859, quoted in [27, p. 29]].
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have been many diﬀerent schools of thought about how tax-
onomic work should proceed in practice. One problem is
that, as new knowledge comes to light, taxonomies are con-
stantly being revised, such that in certain cases species are
moved from one genus to another. Because of the binomial
naming scheme, this, of course, means that the name of the
species has to be changed as well. Various approaches have
been suggested to deal with this problem and other problems
inherent in the Linnaean system. The dominant approach to
biological taxonomy today is historical; that is, entities are
classiﬁed according to their causal, genealogical, relations
rather than their intrinsic qualitative or essential features.
But even within the historical approach there are diﬀerent
ways of proceeding (although most of these are still one var-
iation or another of an adapted Linnaean scheme), and this
has led to serious diﬀerences of opinionwithin the communi-
ty of taxonomists. Ereshefsky says, ‘‘The debate among biol-
ogists concerning general schools and species concepts has
been extensive and at times rancorous.’’ [27, p. 51].
The debate has become even more rancorous in the last
few years, with the announcement and development of the
PhyloCode system [44–50]. The original developers of the
PhyloCode, de Queiroz, and Gauthier, argue for phyloge-
netic names, stated in terms of common descent and phylo-
genetic entities [48]. The PhyloCode as it is currently
envisioned has seven ‘‘Principles,’’ including that names
need to be unique and stable, and that relationships are a
matter of ‘‘hypothesis.’’ Principle six states: ‘‘The Phylo-
Code permits freedom of taxonomic opinion with regard
to hypotheses about relationships; it only concerns how
names are to be applied within the context of a given phy-
logenetic hypothesis.’’ [49]. The PhyloCode has not yet
gone into operation, but the debates surrounding it are
strong. An article in Science several years ago reported
on interviews with a number of biologists, including Mi-
chael Donoghue at Yale and Kevin Nixon at Cornell:
‘‘The resulting controversy over the new naming system,
known as PhyloCode, has pitted colleague against col-
league, oﬃce mate against oﬃce mate. Youve got people
willing to throw down their lives on both sides, says Mi-
chael Donoghue. . .’’ [50, p. 2304], and ‘‘. . .[PhyloCode] is
not going to die out, because the spinmeisters behind this
have the ear of the large funding agencies. . .They are going
to erect a shadow government and [set up] a coup, Nixon
complains. This is arrogance.’’ [50, p. 2307].
2. Conclusion
Early in the twentieth century, the philosopher Hans
Vaihinger suggested that the goal of the scientiﬁc enterprise
is to ﬁnd the ‘‘ultimate truth’’ [51].1 Since this is most likely
not attainable, he argued that we as scientists should pro-1 Thanks to Warner Slack for bringing the work of Hans Vaihinger to
my attention.ceed ‘‘as if’’ the constructs we create are true. He refers
to these constructs as ‘‘useful ﬁctions’’ since only in this
way will science advance: ‘‘It is in fact the essential object
of science to develop only such ideas as have an objective
correlate and to eliminate all admixture of the subjective.
Such a task is, however, not easily accomplished. . .the ide-
al, in which the world of ideas consists exclusively of con-
gruous, well-ordered and non-contradictory constructs is
only to be attained slowly and with diﬃculty. . . It must
be remembered that the object of the world of ideas as a
whole is not the portrayal of reality—this would be an
utterly impossible task—but rather to provide us with an
instrument for ﬁnding our way about more easily in this
world.’’ [51, p. 15]. Jacquette recently echoed these ideas,
saying that scientiﬁc ontologies must be adequate for their
individual purposes: ‘‘None of these need be the ontology
in big letters that correctly explains the way things really
are. . .’’ [52, p. 5]. He goes on to say, ‘‘A correct pure philo-
sophical ontology. . .must aspire to objectivity while
remaining open-minded about the existence of subjective
phenomena.’’ [52, p. 8].
The philosophers, scientists, and other scholars discussed
in this paper have all attempted to create representations that
depicted reality as they understood it. They have done this by
creating, in most cases, carefully constructed conceptualiza-
tions that are intended to represent some domain of interest,
including the knownworld. The resulting artifacts are neces-
sarily biased—where bias is understood to be a predisposed
tendency to a certain point of view—because they have been
shaped by their designers and the variety of purposes they
had inmind. Some have been interested in elucidating funda-
mental philosophical and linguistic ideas, others in catalogu-
ing all that is known for epistemological reasons, and still
others have had more practical concerns, such as pedagogy
and standardization for enhanced communication or infor-
mation access. Depending on our own orientation, we may
ﬁnd some of these artifacts useful and well-formulated, and
we may ﬁnd others amusing, quaint, outdated, ill-formed,
or otherwise inadequate.
When evaluating any conceptualization, whether it be
historical or one that is created today, it may be useful
for us to consider its underlying biases. This also implies
that those of us who create conceptualizations must, to
the extent we are able to do so, be clear about our own
biases. This may mitigate the sometimes acrimonious or
even arrogant debates about whether a particular represen-
tation is the one and only correct representation in a ﬁeld
of interest.
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